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How climate change skeptical leaders may “Trump” 
supporters’ pro-environmental engagement
Steph Johnson Zawadzki*, Thijs Bouman, Linda Steg, and Perri B. Druen
Background
The scientific consensus is that anthropogenic climate change
is real and needs to be addressed urgently1,2. Countries all over
the world have committed to climate change mitigation (e.g., the
Paris Climate Agreement3). Yet, recent elections in various
countries saw climate skeptics rise to prominence4.
We aim to explore how climate change engagement may be
impacted when climate skeptical leaders are elected and
implement policies that contribute to climate change.
Method
Design: questionnaires at 3 time points; independent samples
Timing:
• T1: 1 day before US presidential election (N=423)
• T2: 20 days after Trump’s inauguration (N=427)
• T3: 100 days after Trump’s inauguration (N=432)
Sample: US population recruited via MTURK
Measures: indicators of climate change engagement and
support for presidential candidates
• Beliefs: ‘To what extent do you think the world’s climate is
changing?’ (1 = Definitely not, 7 = Definitely); ‘To what extent
do you think that climate change is caused by human
activity? (e.g., CO2 emissions, burning of fossil fuels)’ (1 =
Not at all, 7 = Completely)
• Perceived risk: ‘How bad or good do you think the potential
impact of climate change will be on people across the
world?’ (1 = Very bad, 7 = Very good; R)
• Emotional engagement: e.g., ‘I would feel guilty if I did not
act in an environmentally-friendly manner,’ (1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree)
• Behavioral intentions: ‘To what extent are you willing to save
energy for the sake of reducing climate change?’ (1 = Not at
all, 7 = Completely)
• Policy preferences: ‘Do you think the United States should
abide by the provisions of the Paris Climate Agreement?’ (1 =
Definitely not, 7 = Definitely)
• Support for major party candidates: two single items, ‘What
is your impression of [Donald Trump / Hillary Clinton]?’ (1 =
Very negative, 7 = Very positive). Support for [Trump/Clinton]
operationalized as above midpoint (> 4); ‘Neither’ group
operationalized as midpoint or below (<= 4) for both
candidates
N’s of support for the presidential candidates, split by wave
Results
Trump supporters’ behavioral intentions, perceived risks,
emotional engagement, and policy preferences lower than prior
to presidential election (ps < .05). Beliefs in climate change
stable (ps > .13).
Emotional engagement with pro-environmental behavior
mediates5 the relations between time and behavioral
intentions, perceived risk of climate change, and policy
preferences among Trump supporters.
Clinton supporters showed no changes over time.
People who support neither Trump nor Clinton showed a
significant increase in anthropogenic climate change beliefs,
and similar trends toward increased climate change
engagement for other target measures, but ns.
Time → Feelings Feelings → Outcome Indirect effects




intentions -0.40 0.14 0.004 0.76 0.06 <0.001 -0.30 0.10 -0.52 -0.11
Perceived risk of 
CC -0.41 0.13 0.002 0.24 0.05 <0.001 -0.10 0.04 -0.18 -0.04
Policy 
preferences -0.49 0.16 0.002 0.64 0.07 <0.001 -0.31 0.10 -0.53 -0.12
T1 T2 T3
N % N % N %
Trump 108 24% 116 27% 110 25%
Clinton 132 29% 150 34% 141 32%
Neither 183 41% 161 37% 181 41%
Discussion
Trump supporters showed a decrease in their climate change
engagement over time. These changes were partially explained
by their reduced emotional engagement with pro-environmental
behavior. This is consistent with multiple social psychological
theories, like heuristic-based decision-making6, evaluating risks
as feelings7,8, and the Elaboration Likelihood Model9. Our
findings suggest that climate skeptical leaders may impact
supporters’ engagement with climate change by changing their
feelings about pro-environmental behaviors.
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